The August miniwar between Russia and Georgia was not simply a local conflict about ethnic groups. It has huge implications for the NATO alliance and Europe's future energy security.
by Paul Kieffer
The guns of August are now silent in the Caucasus region, following a two-week conflict between Russia and Georgia, which was formerly part of the Soviet Union. European and American news media had different accounts on who was to blame for the outbreak of hostilities.
It seems clear that on Aug. 1 South Ossetian separatists attacked a military vehicle used by Georgian military observers, injuring five soldiers. This wasn't the first such incident in recent years, and in the past Georgia had repeatedly assured its neighbors that it wanted to settle the South Ossetia impasse by peaceful means.
Instead of an immediate response to the attack, it was six days later when Georgia's President Mikhail Saakashvili sent his troops into the rebel province of South Ossetia on Aug. 7. Early the next morning Russian troops entered the province from the north. Saakashvili may have misjudged Russia's response, or at worst he walked into a trap laid for him by South Ossetian separatists and the Russians themselves.
Russia pressed the attack by bombing Georgian military installations well beyond the borders of the rebel province. Within days Russian troops had also entered undisputed Georgian territory from South Ossetia and another rebel province to the west, Abkhazia. By the time a ceasefire was in place, some 1,700 people were dead and 120,000 Georgians were left homeless.
Why would Russia be so interested in South Ossetia? The Georgian province borders Russia but is within the internationally recognized borders of Georgia. However, for over a decade the Georgian government has had little control over the province after it declared its independence in the mid-1990s.
